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A Good Wife or A Greedy Wife? Women's Roles as Wives in Chinese Corruption News 
Coverage 
 




 Xi Jinping, China’s president, has embarked on the largest anti-corruption campaign in 
modern Chinese history. This study provides insight into the media representing the wife figure in 
contemporary corruption news in China. To this end, this study employs critical discourse analysis 
to analyse news articles from the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The data 
reveals news articles depict wives of corrupt cadres as greedy if they have participated in their 
husbands’ corrupt behaviors. In this sense, wives are represented as being responsible for their 
husbands’ corruption, while the ruling party’s role is marginalized. Thus, this representational 
strategy allows the government to deflect pressure onto the corrupt cadres’ wives and cover up the 
systematic flaws that allow corruption to flourish. By decoding the nature and role of the wife in 
news reports related to corruption, this study contributes to understanding how political power 
influences the construction of the wife figure in corruption news. 
 




China’s rapid economic development and one-party political system has made corruption 
unavoidable (Pei, 2020). Indeed, the rise of State-Owned Enterprises has allowed the CCP to 
consolidate control over a significant share of China’s resources, which has in turn allowed official 
corruption to become widespread in recent decades (Pei, 2020). Upon taking power in 2012, 
President Xi Jinping and the CCP launched an anti-corruption campaign that is widely considered 
to be the most expansive and influential in modern Chinese history—"higher profile, less 
compromising, and more sustained than those of the past” (Keliher & Wu, 2016, p. 6). While the 
goal of ending corruption is desirable, the CCP's anti-corruption campaign serves another function, 
namely, to resolve internal power struggles within the Party (Broadhurst & Wang, 2014). President 
Xi has utilized the Party’s anti-corruption campaign to eliminate political rivals who threaten his 
interests, such as Bo Xilai (Broadhurst & Wang, 2014).     
Nonetheless, the prevalence of corruption can undermine a ruling Party’s authority, which 
is especially true in a one-party political system. As such, the CCP’s carefully crafted anti-
corruption campaign has been a useful tool in establishing and preserving the Party’s authority and 
legitimacy (Broadhurst & Wang, 2014; Pei, 2020; Wang, 2018). In this sense, the highly public 
displays of discipline for corrupt cadres demonstrates to the public the Party’s uncompromising 
position with respect to the so-called integrity and moral righteousness (Broadhurst & Wang, 
2014).  
 
1 Yiyan Li has a Ph.D. in sociology and her research interests are broad, such as gender and media representation. 
She is enthusiastic about conducting research, as research helps her develop a deep understanding of social issues. 
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  In recent years, President Xi Jinping has increasingly used such confessions—which are 
a popular focus of corruption news articles—to tackle social and political challenges (Liu, 2018). 
According to Wang (2018), confessions have been an effective medium used by the CCP to 
transmit its position on corruption, with such confessions almost always consisting of the corrupt 
cadres expressing their feelings of guilt at not being able to take care of their elders, wives, and 
children. Notably, in making their confessions, some cadres also implicate their wives as helping 
to facilitate illegal exchanges (Liu, 2018; Wang, 2018). These confessions run counter to the notion 
that women should be “good wives” (xianneizhu), which means that a woman is “virtuous, stay[s] 
at home, and does not interfere” (Wang, 2018, p. 456). However, this conception of the “good 
wife” not only caters to the patriarchal regime, but it also reinforces gender hierarchies. Although 
women’s roles as wives are an important component of corrupt cadres’ confessions, very few 
studies have focused on how women are treated in discourses on corruption, especially corruption 
news coverage. Chen (2017) has argued that corruption news discourses portray cadres’ mistresses 
as the source of their downfall; however, less attention has been given to how such discourses treat 
women in their roles as wives.  
President Xi has promoted the archetypes of the good wife and the good family as key 
long-term anti-corruption measures. Since taking power in 2012, President Xi has repeatedly 
emphasized the critical role of family in reducing corruption. For instance, at the 5th Full Assembly 
of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) in 2016, President Xi said that: 
 
“every cadre should take the task of building family values as priority, keep upright 
and cultivate himself (lianjie xiushen), and keep upright and manage the family 
(lianjie qijia); while cadres control themselves to keep honest and upright, do not 
forget to manage the spouse, children and staff around” (Zhao, 2017). 
 
In this sense, family (jia) is connected with the state (guo), as cultivating a “good family” is seen 
as an important step in reducing the nation’s corruption. This principle reflects the traditional view 
that the family and the state are inseparable (Li, 2019). Xi further points out that bad family values 
(jiafeng baihuai) are a fundamental driver of cadre misconduct (Zhao, 2017). However, this 
emphasis on family values positions women as being especially responsible for preventing 
corruption, as Xi has decreed that women have “special functions” in building and keeping good 
family values (Zhang, 2018). Specifically, these “special functions” largely refer to women’s 
personalities, their ability to give birth, and their ability to breast feed (funv teyou de shenxin 
tedian, shengyu he buru gongneng) (Zhang, 2018). Thus, Xi’s focus on building family values re-
embeds women into the family and emphasizes their roles as wives (Constantin, 2018).  
In this study, state corruption news discourses are examined in order to obtain a more in-
depth understanding of how such discourses are used to construct women’s roles as wives. 
Specifically, this study explores wives' roles in preventing corruption in China, and it considers 
whether being a good wife is sufficient for keeping one’s cadre husband upright and honest. 
Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute to the understanding of gender relations in China by 
highlighting the political mechanism whereby “the wife” is constructed in corruption news, and 
how the ruling party uses this figure to address social issues. 
In totalitarian countries like China, gender and culture are employed to serve political 
purposes; that is, women’s images are politicalized and instrumentalized (Li, 2015). Indeed, 
Chinese women’s images are connected with various expectations and criteria that are guided by 
party policy (Evans, 2002). Thus, since gendered behaviour is based on the state’s needs (Evans, 
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2002), the blurred boundaries between the public and the private spheres have made women’s lives 
subject to state control (Sun & Chen, 2015).  
During the Maoist era (1949-1976), women’s images were highly politicized. At that time, 
the CCP was struggling to maintain its power and legitimacy, with individuals being expected to 
subordinate their interests to the Party (Leung, 2003). During this period, power and dominance 
were asserted through controlling the means of production and distributing resources to develop 
the economy (Leung, 2003). In this sense, women were recognized as an integral component to 
the construction of China’s socialist society. To encourage women to join the labour force and 
make contributions to the economy (Chen, 2018; Pimentel, 2006; Sun & Chen, 2015), Chairman 
Mao Zedong famously declared that “women can hold up half of the sky.” Women were portrayed 
as “iron girls,” who could do anything men could do, including traditionally male-dominated jobs, 
such as rebar workers (Jin, Manning, & Chu, 2006; Liu, 2019; Sun & Chen, 2015). Although 
women’s status improved due to increased participation in the labour force, their duty was 
nevertheless to oblige to the state (Evans, 2002). 
In the 1980s, the Chinese Government adopted an Opening and Reform policy aimed at 
accelerating economic development. This shift in policy led to changes in women's place in the 
public sphere (Ji et al., 2017; Ji & Wu, 2018; Li & Jiang, 2019; Qian & Jin, 2018; Sun & Chen, 
2015); while the new policies placed an intense focus on economic principles, they also re-cast 
women's lives as "personal"—that is, not the state's business (Liu, 2004). However, the reform era 
and its embrace of the market economy resulted in the privatization of various services and 
enterprises, which in turn created a new set of challenges for women; for example, these reforms 
saw the state gradually roll back welfare programs such as publicly funded childcare, which placed 
most of the burden of childcare on individual families, particularly women (Cook & Dong, 2011; 
Du & Dong, 2010; Ji et al., 2017; Ji & Wu, 2018; Kan & He, 2018; Li & Jiang, 2019; Qian & Jin, 
2018; Sun & Chen, 2015; Yang, 2013). Furthermore, the intense economic reforms led to an 
increase in gender discrimination in the job market, which resulted in most women being laid off 
by the end of the 1990s (Cook & Dong, 2011; Ji et al., 2017; Sun & Chen, 2015). To address such 
structural issues, the mainstream media started to promote the image of the woman-as-housewife, 
and the accompanying narrative that women must choose between "marrying well" or "being 
successful" (Sun & Chen, 2015). However, as Sun and Chen (2015) point out, the dichotomy of 
"marrying well" or "being successful" may have been a deliberate false dichotomy promulgated 
by the mainstream media, as such a forced choice could mask social inequalities and gender 
discrimination in the workplace. 
In 1979, China implemented its One-Child Policy (OCP), which led to further disparities 
in the balance between genders as Chinese culture has traditionally heavily favored males 
(Feldshuh, 2018; Fincher, 2016; Luo & Sun, 2015). Given this strong male-centric orientation, the 
OCP led to many people seeking an abortion if their baby was not male (Fincher, 2016; Luo & 
Sun, 2015). In an attempt to address the surplus of men that had resulted from the One-Child Policy 
and to push women to get married, the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), which is a quasi-
governmental organization that was coined the term "leftover women" (shengnv) in 2007 to 
stigmatize single, educated women who are older than 27 (Feldshuh, 2018; Fincher, 2016; Luo & 
Sun, 2015). The media campaign focus on these “leftover women” amplified the social pressure 
for them and their younger counterparts to get married (Fincher, 2016). 
The above demonstrates how women’s images in China are shaped based on the state’s 
needs, and that these images are enforced through both official policy and intense media 
campaigns. From “iron girls” to “housewives” to “leftover women,” the image of Chinese women 
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has evolved in response to whatever social issues the Chinese government desires to address. 
Interestingly, even during the Maoist era, the CCP also advocated women’s roles as wives and 
mothers, as they believed in the dictum, “more people, more power.” In sum, the images of women 
advocated by the CCP have been based on biologically anchored (i.e., essentialist) gender roles 
and behaviours (Evans, 2002). Based on this logical framework, women should strive to be wives 
and mothers, a role which has been positioned as being central to President Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption strategies. 
Building good family values and being a good wife have become the core elements of Xi’s 
anti-corruption strategies. The good wife (xianneizhu or lianneizhu) is an ancient phrase that was 
used to praise women who were virtuous and who promoted their husband's study, career, and 
social status. Nowadays, the CCP has used the trope of the good wife as a metric for evaluating 
the wives of Party cadres. According to an article published on the front page of the CCDI’s 
website, a good wife should always remind her husband to not accept bribes, abuse power, or 
pursue a life of luxury via dishonorable means. This article in question is comprised of 12 selected 
mini stories that illustrate how one can be a good wife; for instance, one story tells of a wife who 
returned ethically dubious gifts back to the business people who had sent them in order to prevent 
her husband from committing corruption (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 2019). 
In contrast to the figure of the good wife (xianneizhu or lianneizhu), the media has used the figure 
of the greedy wife (tanneizhu) to describe wives who have either participated in corruption 
themselves or who have pushed their husbands to engage in corrupt behaviors (Huang, 2017). 
As media has the power to define reality, controlling media input and outcomes could help 
political actors maintain positive images (Meng, 2016). Similarly, it is much easier to control 
political scandals, such as corruption scandals, if one can control the media and the narrative being 
disseminated by it (Meng, 2016). Indeed, in China, corruption news and information are released 
by official mainstream media, such as the website of the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI). Media organizations are recognized as “the product of state control and 
regulation” (Meng, 2016, p. 814). In recent years, the CCP has tightened its controls on the media, 
making it more of an “ideological apparatus” and mouthpiece for the Party (Meng, 2016). Political 
ideologies affect women’s identities, and media images can contribute to the construction of these 
identities as a strategic response to certain social issues, such as unemployment (Sun & Chen, 
2015). Given the relationship between media and political controls, corruption news coverage 
could be an important way that the good wife and the greedy wife discourse are promoted in China. 
To illustrate how the CCP utilizes the official media to construct the good wife and greedy wife 




Materials and Methods 
The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Commission of Discipline Inspection is 
responsible for addressing issues related to Party discipline and monitoring abuses of power. As 
such, Party members who are “suspected of corruption, bad management or breaking with the 
Party line are liable to be hauled before discipline inspection commissions” (“How China is ruled: 
Discipline Commission,” 2012). The CCDI’s website publicizes CCP policies, releases 
information about the CCDI, and reports cadres who are being inspected or disciplined. In addition, 
the CCDI’s website reports decisions related to and comments from corrupt cadres. Although the 
CCDI’s website’s intended audience is cadres, news articles published on it can reach the public 
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by being forwarded by other websites. In actuality, the government fully controls the coverage of 
official cases of corruption, as these cases are highly politically sensitive and could potentially 
cause social unrest. Generally, three kinds of websites would forward news articles released by 
CCDI: websites of the CCDI’s local branches; other organizations’ websites; and Internet portals 
and Internet forums. For instance, my search for The Crackdown of an “expert” cadre—Warnings 
from Zhu Fulin, the former deputy Mayor of Jinhua, Zhejiang Province (yige “zhuanjiaxing” 
ganbu de yunluo ---- Zhejiangsheng Jinhuashi yuan fushizhang Zhu Fulin anjian jingshilu) in the 
Chinese searching engine, Baidu, returned 28,600 results. One of these results was an article on 
the website of the School of Economics and Management, Harbin University, which had been 
viewed 573 times (School of Economics and Management, 2015). Even before the Internet era, 
newspapers needed to forward corruption cases from state news agencies. For example, in high-
profile cases, such as the 1995 hearing for the former Beijing Party secretary Chen Xitong and 
mayor Wang Baosen, “newspapers [were] required to use the so-called standard draft (Tonggao, 
通稿)” from the state news agency (Zhu, Lu, & Shi, 2012). In summary, corruption news in China 
is initially released by CCDI, but such news articles reach and influence the public via forwarding. 
For this study, I analyzed news articles about corrupt cadres taken from the Repent and 
Warning (Chanhui yu jingshi;忏悔与警示) section of the CCDI’s website. From 2013 to 2016, 
275 news articles were published on this web page, with 90 detailing the cadre’s wife’s 
involvement in his corruption. Since this study is specifically interested in the concepts of the 
“greedy wife” and the “good wife,” only articles that clearly contained one of these terms were 
selected. Next, four articles were randomly selected from the results, the details of which are 
provided in Table 1. 
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No. Title Location and the 
Occupation of 
Cadres 
Date and Word 
Count 
The Greedy Wife/The 
Good Wife 
1 “God of Wealth” who was Smashed by 
Money—Analysis of the case of Ren Jumeng, 
former Vice Chairman of CPPCC and the 
head of the Finance Bureau in Qihe County, 




2013, August 4. 
3,656 words. 
The Greedy Wife 
2 District Mayor Qian was Investigated 
because of Money (In China, Qian is 
pronounced as money)—Analysis of the case 
of Qian Zenghong, the former district mayor 
of Hailing District, Taizhou City, Jiangsu 
Province.3  
Jiangsu Province; 
Mayor of Hailing 
District  
2013, August 16. 
4,005 words. 
The Greedy Wife 
3 Family corruption—Warnings from the case 
of Yu Shaodong, the former director and 
Party secretary of the People’s Congress in 
Chengkou County, Chongqing.4 
Chongqing; Party 





2016, May 20. 
3,314 words. 
The Good Wife 
4 The emergence of accidents ---- Warning 
from the case of Wu Shutian, the former 
director of the Work Safety Bureau in 
Bengbu, Anhui. 5 
Anhui Province; 
the Work Safety 
Bureau. 
2013, August 12. 
4,306 words. 
The Good Wife 
Table 1: Basic Information for the News Articles Obtained from the CCDI Website
 
2 Source from: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jdbg/chyjs/201307/t20130715_155870.html 
3 Source from: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jdbg/chyjs/201307/t20130717_155881.html 
4 Source from: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jdbg/chyjs/201605/t20160519_156118.html 
5 Source from: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jdbg/chyjs/201307/t20130715_155877.html 
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The articles listed in Table 1 detail events in four provinces—Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Chongqing, and Anhui—and focus on individuals from four different occupation areas. The range 
of locations and occupational areas indicate that the concepts of “good wife” and “greedy wife” 
are not specific to any one region or occupational area. In addition, the selected articles are 
relatively long, with all exceeding 3,000 words. 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as both a theory and a method, aims to examine 
discourse and social life (Rogers et al., 2016). Broadly speaking, CDA examines all of the social 
practices, individuals, and institutions that create the epistemological foundation for our 
understanding of various phenomena and "truth" itself (Holsti, 1969). Within CDA, language is 
supposed to be connected with the participants’ social context (Lams & Liu, 2018). Based on the 
CDA, discourse is a way to establish and reinforce power relations (Lams & Liu, 2018), and 
images of wives in corruption news coverage is a research topic. Liu and Guo observe that: 
 
“Through the surface level of language form, CDA aims to reveal the influence of 
ideology on discourse, the counteractive influence of discourse on the ideology, 
and how the two elements derive from and serve social structure and power 
relations” (2016, p. 1076).  
 
In this research, CDA will be deployed to decode media discourse on corruption to understand 
how the good wife/greedy wife is used to reinforce gender issues relating to corruption.              
  Given the CCP’s control over official media sources, using CDA will expose how the 
discourses employed by official media sources strengthen power relations (Liu, 2018). Since 
corruption is a sensitive issue in China’s one-party political system, it is also necessary to 
understand how the CCP goes about identifying individuals guilty of corruption. In his book Media 
Discourse, Fairclough (1995) suggests that the language used by the media should be considered 
as discourse, and that CDA should therefore include linguistic analyses of these media discourses. 
Furthermore, CDA focuses on the media’s relationships with institutions and the wider social and 
cultural context in which it is embedded, “including relations of power and ideologies” 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 33). As such, it is critical that analyses of corruption news coverage examine 
the language and texture of texts, especially the use of values and slogans that are commonly 
viewed as taken-for-granted or commonsense by reporters and audiences.  
In this study, I explore how China’s structures/systems support a particular approach to 
covering the news, and a particular way of portraying women in written media coverage of 
corruption.    Both “good wife” and “greedy wife” are widely spread in the Chinese context, as the 
“good wife” has 33,200,000 search results and the word “greedy wife” has 441,000 search results. 
Like the word “leftover women,” both words were first used by mainstream media, and later, they 
became well-known words in China. Following three steps mentioned by Liu (2018), this study 
utilizes “Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA”, and specifically, the analysis first decodes “the 
textual linguistic features of the item under study. It then interprets the effects of the production 
and consumption of the discourse” (p. 25). According to Fairclough (1995), intertextuality can 
provide insight into the ways in which a discourse is connected to the broader social context, 
including cultural norms and ideologies. The intertextual analysis in this study will compare and 
evaluate how the selected texts construct their representations of their subjects, particularly with 
respect to the inclusion or omission of details or information, the kinds of messages being 
conveyed through the use of ironic or metaphorical language, and their use of the presuppositions 
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of the discourse itself (Fairclough, 1995). Finally, according to Liu (2018), the focus of the analysis 
will be extended to the broad environments to illustrate how the discourse came to be, what 
purpose it serves, and how it continues to reinforce power relations (Fairclough, 1993, 2001, 2003, 




The news articles examined in this study were acquired from the Shencha Diaocha channel 
on the CCDI website. In order to explore the relationship between corruption and the discourse 
used to discuss wives, the news articles are presented according to two themes: the wife, and the 
Party/the state.  
Table 1 shows titles of selected articles, with no title involving the greedy wife or the good 
wife directly, although each article’s title contains metaphorical phrases. Article 1 includes “God 
of Wealth,” which commonly refers to the people who are the head of the financial bureau. “God 
of Wealth” comes from a traditional legend. Traditionally, people enshrine the god of the future 
on the fifth day of the lunar new year, which symbolizes they will receive more money in the new 
year. Article 2 uses the same pronunciation to satirize corrupt cadres. In Article 3, family 
corruption caters to the anti-corruption policy “building good family values.” Article 4 uses 
accidents to satirize the safety bureau as unsafe, as the bureau has corrupt cadres. Those 
metaphorical applications indicate that authors of these articles tried to make corruption news 
articles close to the general public’s daily life to attract people to read. On the other hand, satirizing 




The Discourse of Women: The Good Wife or The Greedy Wife? 
In the articles, the good wife is differentiated from the greedy wife by that fact that she did 
not participate in corrupt acts. Of the four articles, two portrayed the wife as greedy. However, it 
should be noted that, while Article 3 used the term, “the good wife,” the use of quotation marks in 
the article indicates that this term was being used ironically.  
The research results showed that, in corruption news, a woman’s most outstanding role is 
that of being a wife, most clearly evidenced by reporters and investigators’ repeated use of this 
identity category when discussing these women. In these discourses, women were cast as either 
the greedy wife—the wife of a corrupt cadre who not only did not keep her husband upright and 
honest, but also participated in the corruption herself—or the good wife—the wife who kept her 
husband upright and honest, while also maintaining good family values. Surprisingly, these 
women’s account of events, in their own words, is largely absent from these discourses, with only 




“While Ren Jumeng was the head of the financial bureau, many people wanted him 
to help them. Sometimes those people came to our house and brought gifts and 
money. Ren was not at home, so I took those gifts and money, and then I told Ren 
what people wanted his help with” Ren Jumeng’s wife, Jia Mou, said. (Article 1) 
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Jia Mou described the process of taking bribes. Excerpt one typifies corruption narratives 
involving spouses: first the wife gives in to corruption, and then she encourages her husband to 
also engage in corrupt behavior. Although Jia Mou does not describe herself as being greedy, her 
greediness is alluded to when she admits that “Ren was not at home, so I took those gifts and 
money,” thus indicating that she participated in corruption. The decision to include Jia Mou’s 
account of taking bribes serves to emphasize a fundamental moral point in corruption discourses: 
a greedy wife can cause serious trouble for their husband.  
 
Excerpt Two 
Jia Mou, the wife of Ren Jumeng, used to live in the village and moved to the county 
because of the husband's job promotions […] Generally, she should be satisfied 
with a normal life in the county, as she had lived in poverty for a long time when 
she was in the village. However, she became a greedy wife— “I accept money for 
him, he does things for people." She accepted money for Ren Jumeng, as Ren was 
not suitable to accept the money […] She also accepted money sent by Ren’s 
colleagues […] (Article 1) 
 
Title: “Repaying Qian Zenghong for his kindness," wife helped her husband commit corrupt acts 
(Qinqing huibao, fuzhufutan) 
 
   …… 
As the old Chinese saying goes, “a good wife will help cadre to keep honest and 
upright and live in poverty (jia you xianqi, ze shi neng anpinshouzheng).” However, 
Qian Zenghong’s wife not only failed to prevent Qian’s corruption, but she became 
a greedy wife (tanneizhu). This couple “cooperated together” (peihe moqi) and 
engaged in a farce in which the wife conspired with the husband (hangxieyiqi; 
沆瀣一气) and accumulated wealth by corruption (gongtong liancai). 
 
When some business people would visit Qian’s house, Qian would not appear; 
rather, his wife would accept their money and gifts, and then tell Qian about their 
requests. Later, many people knew that Qian’s wife could “accept money and gifts 
for Qian” (“zuozhu”). His wife also liked to show her face in public (paotoulumian) 
and do things for money (bang ren lanshi), so she became the spokesperson of 
Qian. (Article 2) 
 
In Article 1, the comparison between living conditions between the village and the county affects 
the subsequent interpretation of the discourse. It presupposes that readers understand the hierarchy 
of living conditions in China (i.e., the county is better than the village, and the city is better than 
the county). The third-person narration suggests that Jia Mou was greedy by commenting that she 
should be “satisfied” with the better living conditions in the county; that is, if her quality of life 
has improved by moving to the county, her lack of satisfaction must be an indication of greediness. 
Moreover, this discourse serves to remind readers of the perils of family corruption (jiazu shi 
fubai), and how good family values can serve as a bulwark against it (Zhao, 2017). However, 
exclusively attributing corruption to the erosion of family values is problematic, as it does not 
consider the influence of the one-party system. This shift in emphasis is revealing, as it shows how 
the framing of a discourse can be used to strategically preserve existing power structures: rather 
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than exploring the one-party system’s vulnerability to corruption, thereby raising questions about 
its efficacy and legitimacy, the author elects to blame the family’s corruption on the wife’s failure 
to uphold strong family values.   
Based on Liu’s (2018) observation, the author of the news article could influence readers’ 
understanding via a set of careful choices of words and phrases. In Article 2, for example, the title 
includes the metaphorical phrase, “wife helped the husband to commit corruptions”, which is based 
on a proverb (fuchangfusui (夫唱妇随)) that says that a wife should always obey her husband. The 
statement, “The wife should always obey her husband,” is a metaphor for the harmony between 
husband and wife; in contrast, “the wife helped her husband commit corrupt acts,” means the wife 
helps the husband to commit corruption and they commit corruption together. The use of the phrase 
“the wife helped her husband commit corrupt acts” presupposes that readers are familiar with the 
proverb “the wife should obey her husband,” as both use very similar wording. Furthermore, “wife 
helped her husband commit corrupt acts” invokes traditional gender ideologies, which hold that a 
wife must obey her husband. This is evident in the author’s deliberate inclusion of the terms, 
"husband," "wife," "help," "corruption," which also serve to confirm the helping role played by 
women in corruption cases. The author’s allusion to the old saying, "Repaying one for his or her 
kindness (qinqing huibao)," in the title of Article 2 also serves to evoke a moral point: the wife 
aids in abetting her husband’s corruption in the same way that she repays his kindness.  
In China’s moral system, it is considered virtuous to repay people’s kindness. This is 
illustrated by the expression that a drop of water given to a person in need shall be returned with a 
burst of spring (dishui zhi en, dang yongquan xiang bao;滴水之恩，当涌泉相报); 
that is, even if others provide just a little help, one should return the favour with all one can when 
others are in need (360doc.com, n.d.). Both “wife helped her husband commit corrupt acts” and 
“repaying one for his or her kindness,” warn that a wife should never aid her husband in 
committing acts of corruption. Furthermore, the use of these two sayings presupposes that readers 
are familiar with both them and China’s moral system, as well as the fact that the sayings are being 
used in an ironic manner to express the opposite meaning.   
In the first paragraph, the narration strengthens the perception that Qian Zenghong’s wife 
was greedy and responsible for his corruption by using the old Chinese saying, "a good wife will 
help cadre to keep honest and upright and live in poverty." This old saying establishes a cause-
effect relation: if the wife is a good wife, the husband will be content in poverty, and will be upright 
and honest. The phrase, “contented in poverty” (an pin), comes from a proverb, which states that 
one should content oneself with poverty and devote oneself to things spiritual (anpin ledao;安
贫乐道). Thus, according to this proverb, people should insist on upholding the integrity of their 
moral principles, even if they find themselves living in poverty. This proverb expresses cultural 
and societal expectations for ancient cadres, as they received only a small salary, but were expected 
to be morally advanced. In Article 2, the use of this proverb directly indicates that a good wife will 
take the main responsibility for her husband's actions [a good wife will help cadre to keep honest 
and upright and live in poverty (jia you xianqi, ze shi neng anpinshouzheng)], while a bad or greedy 
wife will not. In addition to this proverb, the use of the expressions, "greedy wife," "cooperation 
together," "conspire with the husband," and "accumulated wealth by corruption" illustrate the 
dangers posed by a greedy wife. In this sense, a good wife should act as a supervisor who ensures 
that her husband is behaving properly. 
Next, Article 2 introduces the wife’s behaviour as facilitating corruption. The phrase, 
“accepted money and gifts for Qian (zuozu)," and the word, "liked," depict the wife as an active 
participant in the corrupt behaviours. The wife’s corruption is further established through the use 
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of the proverb, “liked to show her face in public (paotoulumian),” and the phrase, “do things for 
money (bang ren lanshi)," which indicate that she is willing to accept money and gifts for her 
husband. Although the label, "greedy wife," is only used once in Article 2, the use of metaphor, 
irony, ancient precepts, proverbs, and description firmly establishes that the wife in question is 
greedy. In casting the wife as greedy, the discourse shifts readers' attention to the wife's qualities 
and behaviours, while ignoring other potential causes of corruption, such as the political system's 
flaws. Put simply, Article 2 normalizes the relationship between the wife and corruption.  
In China, mainstream media is primarily responsible for the construction of the discourse 
wherein the greedy wife fails to keep her husband upright and honest. This is notable, as such 
discourses resonate with the anti-corruption policies—building good family values—proposed by 
President Xi Jinping. At the end of 2012, the Xinhua News Agency released a special article 
wherein Xi warned his family members, relatives, and friends not to do any business with 
companies he had previously been involved with, and not to use his name for personal gain 
(CCTV.com, 2018). In this article, Xi connects family values with anti-corruption by pledging to 
“be honest and keep his family in order” (lianjie qijia;廉洁齐家), which in turn obligates 
party members to also be honest and ensure good family values as part of their obligation to the 
paternalistic nation. Strategies such as this have subsequently been implemented by many local 
governments and government organs. For instance, since 2014, the All-China Women’s Federation 
(ACWF) (quanguo fulian;全国妇联), which is a quasi-government organization that is 
mandated to solve women’s issues and promote gender equality, has promoted its initiative to 
“Build an honest atmosphere; family helps to ensure that people are honest and upright (shu 
qinglian jiafeng, jiating zhulian;树清廉家风，家庭助廉)” (Xinhua Net, 2016). This initiative 
requires women to be good wives in order to educate their families on how to be honest, and to 
maintain an honest family atmosphere, which is in line with the Party’s view of the family as the 
foundation of anti-corruption (Xinhua Net, 2016). The discourse of the greedy wife reinforces the 
meaning of the good wife and the Party’s anti-corruption strategy. 
Besides the anti-corruption campaign, the idea of a good woman and a good wife is widely 
advocated by the Chinese government. In the 1940s, the former premier, Zhou Enlai, proposed a 
role model—"good woman”—which indicated women's roles as mothers and workers (Xue, 
2016). This role model later became a discourse of the ACWF during Maoist (Chen, 2017). The 
ACWF is supposed to be the propaganda tool of the CCP and keep promoting the CCP's ideologies 
during the Post-Mao regime (Johns, n.d.; Stacey, 1984). Since China has implemented the Opening 
and Reforming policy in 1978, the planned economy has shifted to the market economy. However, 
the retreat of the welfare state re-emphasized women's family roles, and the ACWF kept promoting 
them. Since 1985, the ACWF selected "Five Virtues Families (Wu Hao Jiating)" (outstanding in 
such five aspects as law-abiding, diligent study, family planning, domestic harmony, and 
industrious and thrifty management of the household) to highlight women's contribution to the 
family (Chinadaily, n.d.). Also, women's roles as mothers were promoted by the "Ten Outstanding 
Mothers (shi da jiechu muqin)" (Guo, 2010). Later, in the 1990s, women were encouraged to 
choose the family role to solve social inequalities and gender discrimination (Sun & Chen, 2015). 
In recent years, the word "leftover women" were widely spread in mainland China, and many 
articles blamed educated women for not marrying and having children (Feldshuh, 2018; Fincher, 
2016; Luo & Sun, 2015; Richardson, 2018). In the meeting with leaders of the ACWF in 2013, 
President Xi Jinping mentioned women's "unique roles" in "promoting Chinese traditional family 
values and establish[ing] good family ethics," and "voluntarily shoulder[ing] the responsibility of 
respecting the elderly and caring for the young" (Richardson, 2018). The above role models 
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indicated that women's main roles are still in the family, and women were supposed to be 
responsible for building a good family in order be a "good woman" or "good wife." According to 
Chen (2017), women role models are actually being duplicated in the anti-corruption campaign, 
and moral women were formulated as tools to stop corruption. The corruption news discourse 
blamed the greedy wife and praised the good wife (Chen, 2017). Indeed, women were blamed for 
being irresponsible in building a good family. For instance, in Article 2, the wife was blamed for 
failing to keep a good family by committing corruption with the husband (i.e. a good wife will 
help cadre to keep honest and upright and live in poverty (jia you xianqi, ze shi neng 
anpinshouzheng); However, Qian Zenghong's wife not only failed to prevent Qian's corruption, 
but she became a greedy wife (tanneizhu). The dichotomy of the "good wife" versus the "greedy 
wife" promotes women's responsibility in managing family members and ending corruption within 
the family (Chen, 2017). However, women were scapegoats of corruption, as corruption news does 
not go deep to discuss the political system's flaws that are at the root of corruption. 
Excerpts one and two do not establish the wives in question as greedy wives through their 
own words; rather, they reinforce their central role in the corrupt behaviours using ancient precepts 
and anti-corruption policies. At this point, it is important to clarify that this analysis is not aimed 
at demonstrating that these wives were faultless in these acts of corruption. On the contrary, this 
analysis aims to demonstrate that these discourses treat women unequally by judging them based 
on their role as wife. Indeed, the emphasis on these women’s roles as a “wife” reflects the 
resurgence of Confucianism and gender relations in contemporary society. Since the market 
economic reforms of 1978, Chinese women have encountered more challenges, as the market 
reforms intensified the conflict between women’s private and public roles and eroded gender 
equality (Chen, 2018; Constantin, 2018; Li & Jiang, 2019). The ideal family, which is promoted 
by the state as a harmonious family, consists of young couples living with their parents: the 
husband focuses on work outside of the home, the mother-in-law helps to care for the 
grandchildren and with the housework, and the wife gives birth to children and maintains the 
household. In this model, the dutiful wife is taken-for-granted (Zavoretti, 2017; Zurndorfer, 2018). 
In this sense, traditional cultural attitudes about gender remain persistent in Chinese society, which 
means that gender discrimination is all too common and largely ignored (He & Wu, 2017). As a 
result of the resurgence of traditional culture, the family and the wife have become important 
components of anti-corruption strategies. 
In sum, the news articles above cast wives as a greedy and as failing to keep their husbands 
morally upright, thereby failing at preventing corruption. Although the author sometimes inserts 
wives’ words into the article, readers’ perception of wives is largely dependent on the author’s 
narrative choices (Liu, 2018). While news articles use descriptions of the corruption process to 
portray wives as greedy, it is important to also understand the CCP’s role in these articles.  
 
 
The Discourse of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not speak for itself in corruption news 
articles, it is invariably represented as not being complicit with corruption. As the ruling Party, the 
CCP is portrayed as unwaveringly upright and committed to detecting corruption and meting out 
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On June 29, 2018, the Intermediate People’s Court of Dezhou, Shandong province 
made the original judge for Ren Jumeng’s case: Ren was convicted of taking bribes 
and sentenced to 13 years in prison, […].  
Jia Mou, who was Ren’s wife, was convicted of taking bribes and sentenced to 1 
year in prison, two years in probation.  
[…] (Article 1) 
 
Comments: from those corruption cases, family members’ indulgence in corruption 
(jiafeng baihuai; 家风败坏) were mainly accounted for corruption cadres’ 
illegal behaviour. […] 
Everybody has family members, but they cannot violate laws and rules. […] 
As a Party member, cadres should differentiate individual emotion with laws and 
rules and differentiate the use of public power and the interest of individuals and 
family. Cadres should not work for the family by abusing public power. […] 
[…] (Article 3) 
 
Solutions: build the “anti-corruption wall” for cadres 
Improve cadres’ qualities by intensifying anti-corruption education. […] 
Improve supervision, making sure that power is not abused by any cadre. […] 
Facilitate the political system and prevent corruption from the source. Building a 
healthy and transparent political system is an effective strategy to prevent 
corruption. [..] 
Improve the family capacity to prevent corruption. […]. In this sense, … we should 
intensify the anti-corruption programs, such as “the good wife, the good children 
and the good relatives” … (Article 4) 
 
In Excerpt three, when introducing the trial results of Ren Junmeng and his wife, Jia Mou, the 
article states, “was convicted of taking bribes” and “sentenced to prison,” indicating that their 
corruption was an individual problem, and not a problem with the CCP more broadly. Similarly, 
the investigator’s comments indicate that the corruption was directly caused by the cadre’s family 
members, and that the ruling Party had nothing to do with it. In Article 3, the CCP is portrayed as 
standing against corruption in the name of the public’s interest. However, Article 3 fails to mention 
the CCP’s failure to supervise corrupt cadres and the political system’s propensity for corruption, 
and how the corrupt cadres were detected without the supervision of the public. Although Article 
4 mentions the need to improve the political system, it does not provide any details about how to 
do so. Instead, the article simply indicates a vague goal with respect to the construction of a 
political system: “we need to build a reasonable structure for the operation of power…” While the 
ruling party’s responsibility in stopping corruption is never stated in any sort of clear detail, the 
figure of the good wife is explicitly mentioned as a solution. In sum, corruption news articles use 
the greedy wife discourse along with many specific examples to illustrate how women become 
involved in corruption due to greediness, but only discuss any culpability on the part of the Party 
or political system in the vaguest of terms.  
Overall, the discourse of the CCP as an upright Party also aims to reinforce the Party’s 
image in China, as the CCP has a long history of keeping a good public image. As the only ruling 
party, the CCP strives to build a positive image of Chinese history in order to make the current 
system look like the only possible mode of rule for Chinese society. The CCP emphasizes what it 
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considers to be great achievements, through a variety of different media forms, including middle 
school textbooks, TV programs, and movies. For instance, the film My People, My Country (wo 
he wode zuguo), which is a movie that celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Foundation of PRC, 
consists of seven achievements, including the foundation of PRC, the successful explosion of the 
first atom bomb in the 1960s, the Chinese women volleyball team’s Olympic gold medal in 1984, 
the return of Hong Kong, the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 70th anniversary of the victory of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, and the manned spacecraft Shenzhen-11’s successful return to Earth 
(Zhang, 2019). On the other hand, media and official state materials tend to simplify or altogether 
avoid any social issues, disasters, or sensitive issues that the CCP may be responsible for, such as 
the brutal suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests and the Cultural Revolution. Finally, 
it is noteworthy that textbooks in a course about politics make no mention of the state’s corruption 




In corruption news articles, women are described as greedy wives who should be held 
responsible for corruption, though they did not have much voice in these articles. To be a good 
wife, women should monitor their husbands' behaviour and fulfill traditional feminine roles. The 
greedy wife was constructed by the mainstream media to stigmatize the wife involved in 
corruption. By continuing to reinforce the behaviour of a greedy wife, the state media try to 
establish the rules women are expected to conform to—manage the household and the husband's 
behaviour, and cater to the Party’s anti-corruption strategies. By detecting and dealing with corrupt 
cadres and their greedy wives, the CCP legitimized itself as an upright and responsible ruling party.  
However, the strategy of a good wife and building good family values can hardly prevent 
corruption effectively, as in a contemporary Chinese family the wife does not have very much 
marital power. According to Hu and Scott (2016), China has a deep-rooted patriarchal culture, and 
men always hold power in making decisions, while older people in an extended family hold power. 
On the other hand, some scholars propose that by doing housework or making household decisions 
such as choosing what to eat for dinner women can also gain power (Shu, Zhu, & Zhang, 2013; 
Zuo & Bian, 2005). Although women have some power in making trivial decisions, men are still 
the breadwinners in the household. In this imbalanced family power structure, women do more 
housework than men. Such family labour division reflects traditional patriarchal norms; that is, 
women are supposed to manage the household, and men are supposed to support the family. Power 
in making important decisions and in allocating resources helps men build authority in the family, 
and such an authority maintains the family. In this sense, the wife is less likely to be an effective 
tool to stop omnipotent corruption in China. 
In sum, news articles consistently highlight corruption as the fault of individual women. 
By doing so, the news takes away attention from more systemic problems related to the political 
system, seldom discussing the CCP’s failure to monitor cadres or to change procedures that make 
corruption possible. News framing is a political strategy for the CCP. By repeatedly emphasizing 
individual faults, the CCP is mitigating political pressure, as corruption scandals are serious in 
democratic countries and may trigger the demise of the ruling Party.  
  
106 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 22, No. 9 September 2021 
Conclusions 
This study decoded women’s roles as wives in corruption news articles which were 
released by the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The discourse of the greedy 
wife, which stigmatized the wife as helper and facilitator in corruption, has become a tool that 
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